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I. Introduction

The ongoing court battle between Medtronic
Inc. and the IRS illustrates the stakes involved in
transfer pricing disputes and reflects the difficulty
of accounting for the role of risk-taking in setting

transfer prices.1 According to the IRS, Medtronic
shifted profit from the United States to Puerto
Rico, underpaying its U.S. income taxes in 2005
and 2006 by more than $1 billion.2 Allegedly, the
profit shifting was achieved by minimizing the
amount of royalties paid by Medtronic’s Puerto
Rican subsidiary to the U.S. parent company
under an intercompany license. Because the taxes
Medtronic paid in Puerto Rico were negligible, the
underpayment went straight to Medtronic’s
bottom line.
In a June 2016 opinion, the Tax Court
essentially blessed Medtronic’s transfer pricing
results, finding that the company underpaid its
3
U.S. income taxes by less than $15 million. On
4
appeal, in a March 2018 decision, the Eighth
Circuit found the Tax Court’s analysis to be
lacking and therefore reversed and remanded the
case for further consideration. Among other
things, the Eighth Circuit instructed the Tax Court
to make specific findings about the allocation of
risk between the parent and the subsidiary.5 The
court had scheduled further hearings for April 13,
6
2020, but the proceedings have been indefinitely
postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.7

1

Medtronic Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-112, vacated and
remanded, 900 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2019).
2

The IRS argued that Medtronic US underpaid its income taxes by
$548 million in 2005 and $810 million in 2006. It referred to this as a
“classic case” of a U.S. multinational “shifting income from its highly
profitable U.S. operations and intangibles to an offshore subsidiary
operating in a tax haven.” 900 F.3d at 611.
3

The Tax Court determined that Medtronic US had underpaid its
income taxes by only $26.7 million in 2005 and had actually overpaid its
taxes by $12.5 million in 2006.
4
5

900 F.3d 610.
See infra text accompanying note 170 (extended quotation from case).

6

Order of the Tax Court, T.C. Memo. 2016-112 (June 25, 2019) (No.
006944-11).
7

Order of the Tax Court, T.C. Memo. 2016-112 (Mar. 16, 2020) (No.
006944-11).
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Now is a good time to take stock of the case.
After delving deeply into Medtronic, this report
suggests how the court might go about assessing
what risks each party did in fact bear and
determining proper transfer prices in light of its
findings.
From the outset, I should make clear that I
believe the Tax Court’s decision was flawed and
would result in substantial profit shifting, which
transfer pricing rules are supposed to prevent. To
be sure, the IRS’s analysis also had serious faults,
but I believe the results of that analysis were
closer to the truth. The IRS’s approach would
benchmark the return-on-assets ratio (operating
profit/operating assets) earned by the Puerto
Rican subsidiary against the return on assets
earned by independent companies that the IRS
believed had comparable functions, assets, and
risks. The Tax Court’s decision allowed the Puerto
Rican subsidiary to earn a return on assets of 152
8
percent in 2005 and 218 percent in 2006. For
reference in assessing whether profit shifting was
likely, Medtronic as a whole earned a return on
9
assets of only 55 percent. A company that owns
few or no intangible assets like the Puerto Rican
subsidiary would generally be expected to earn
far less.
Transfer pricing — the pricing of business
transactions between related parties — provides
opportunities for multinational enterprises to
shift profits into low-tax jurisdictions. For
example, if a U.S. parent company licenses
intangible property to a foreign subsidiary in a
low-tax country, profit will be shifted if the
royalty payments made by the foreign subsidiary
are lower than they should be. That is, the foreign
subsidiary’s taxable profits after paying the
royalties will be higher than appropriate, while
the taxable income earned by the U.S. parent (the
royalty income) will be lower. As a result of

8

According to the IRS, Medtronic Puerto Rico Operations Co.’s
(MPROC’s) operating profit after taking into account the adjustments
required by the Tax Court was $598 million in 2005 and $925 million in
2006. Brief for the Appellant at 27 n.10, Medtronic, 900 F.3d 610 (8th Cir.
2017) (No. 17-1866). The IRS determined that MPROC’s average
operating assets were $393 million in 2005 and $424 million in 2006.
Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief at 32, T.C. Memo. 2016-112 (June 30, 2016) (No. 00694411).
9

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 242.
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shifting the profits from the parent to the
subsidiary, the multinational group will have
lowered its overall tax burden.
Let’s take a simple example. Suppose US Co,
10
subject to 35 percent income tax, developed a
valuable invention. Assume the invention
required no further development effort, so any
royalty received by US Co would be pure profit.
US Co then licensed the invention to its
subsidiary, Haven Co, which enjoys a 2 percent
tax rate. Haven Co will manufacture and sell the
invention worldwide. Assume Haven Co’s
financial performance before paying a royalty is
as shown in Table 1:
Table 1. Illustrative Example:
Haven Co Financial Performance
Sales

$1,000

Total costs and expenses

$600

Pre-royalty operating profit

$400

An operating margin equal to 40 percent of
sales, as in this example, is quite formidable and
clearly indicates that the invention contains very
valuable intangible property. Haven Co must pay
a royalty to US Co, the developer and owner of the
property. Consider two cases for setting the
amount of the royalty:
First case. Based on the rate in a license
between unrelated parties, the royalty rate is set at
15 percent of sales.11 The result is a $150 royalty
($1,000 sales * 15 percent). Haven Co’s taxable
profit would be $250 ($400 pre-royalty profit $150 royalty), which would be subject to $5 tax
($250 * 2 percent). US Co’s taxable income would
be the $150 royalty, which would be subject to
$52.50 tax ($150 * 35 percent). Total taxes would be
$57.50.
Second case. The royalty is set at whatever
rate would result in Haven Co earning taxable
profit equal to 10 percent of sales, the same
margin earned by an unrelated company with

10

I have chosen to use the 35 percent tax rate that was applicable in
the years at issue in Medtronic, but the example could just as easily use
the current 21 percent rate.
11

This is an example of the comparable uncontrolled transaction
method, described infra in text accompanying notes 33 to 37, which was
the method used by the Tax Court in Medtronic.
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12

similar functions and risks. The result is a $300
royalty, as would be required to ensure Haven Co
earns a taxable profit of $100 ($1,000 sales * 10
percent). On this $100 of income, Haven Co would
pay $2 tax ($100 * 2 percent). US Co’s taxable
income would be the $300 royalty, which would
be subject to $105 tax ($300 * 35 percent). Total
taxes would be $107.
If the second case is the correct one, US Co
succeeds in shifting $200 of profit to Haven Co by
adopting the approach in the first case instead.
Through profit shifting, the group saves $49.50 in
taxes because more income is in Haven Co’s lowtax jurisdiction and less income is subject to high
taxes in US Co’s hands.
How then do we determine which is the
correct case? For all its flaws, the arm’s-length
standard remains the means by which tax
authorities worldwide police transfer pricing and
try to combat improper profit shifting. The arm’slength standard requires that the pricing of
transactions between related parties be the same
as it would be if the parties were unrelated. As
described in Section II, this is the standard
adopted by the United States in regulations under
section 482. Further guidance on the arm’s-length
standard is found in the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines,13 which represent the consensus views
of the United States and other OECD members.
There is significant tension in transfer pricing
rules between the concepts of price and profit.
Although a price must ultimately be determined
for each related-party transaction, the
determination of that price will often depend on
the profit that should be earned by one or both
parties to that transaction. In the earlier example,
the price is the royalty rate. In the first case, the 15
percent royalty rate is set directly by reference to
the rate in a transaction between unrelated
parties; no consideration is given to the resulting
profits earned by either US Co or Haven Co. In
this report, I question whether it is appropriate to
benchmark a price by reference to a purportedly
comparable transaction unless profitability is also

12

This is an example of the comparable profits method, described
infra in text accompanying notes 38 to 41, which was the method
advocated by the IRS in Medtronic.
13

OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
and Tax Administrations” (2017).

given due consideration. In the second case, an
effective royalty rate of 30 percent ($300 royalty/
$1,000 sales) is backed into by setting Haven Co’s
profit to a specified level.
In the transfer pricing field, it is axiomatic that
profits derive from a combination of functions
performed, assets used, and risks assumed.14
When it comes to assets, a distinction should be
made between intangible property and other
assets such as plant and equipment. It is well
accepted that intangible property is the main
15
driver of premium profits. On the other hand, in
the absence of intangible assets, the performance
of operational functions and the use of tangible
16
assets give rise only to routine profits. The
second case in the example above assumes that
the routine profit can be measured by the selected
profit benchmark (10 percent of sales) and that the
amount of the derived royalty payment
constitutes the premium profit attributable to the
intangible property.
While risk is often considered to be another
17
driver of premium profit, it is too facile to simply
identify risk as a driver of profit; a more nuanced
analytic framework is necessary. A more nuanced
approach involves recognizing that the bearing of
risk affects profits in two different ways. First, it is
a well-known tenet of finance and economics that
increased risk normally must be compensated by
an increase in the expected return from an
activity.18 That is, for a company to agree to take on
significant risk, it will generally require a higher

14

The regulations frame the issue in slightly different terms in
different sections. In all cases, the somewhat vaguer phrase “resources
employed” is used instead of “assets used.” For example, in the “-1”
regulations, guidance on conducting a functional analysis refers upfront
to functions performed and resources employed (reg. section 1.4821(d)(3)(i)), while risk is given extensive treatment but buried deeply in
the regulations. For their part, the OECD transfer pricing guidelines,
supra note 13, use the phrase “functions performed, assets used and risks
assumed” or similar formulations more than 50 times.
15

See, e.g., Wolfgang Schoen, “International Taxation of Risk,” 68 Bull.
Int’l Tax’n 280 (2014). Schoen refers more generally to “rents,” which
include natural resources as well as intangible property. Transfer pricing
issues involving natural resources are outside the scope of the report.
16

The distinction between routine and nonroutine contributions is
introduced by the regulations governing the residual profit-split method
(RPSM). See infra text accompanying notes 44 to 46. The “routine”
terminology has been extended by practitioners to refer to companies
that own few intangibles and bear few risks and to the relatively modest
profits earned by them.
17

See, e.g., Schoen, supra note 15, passim.

18

See, e.g., Jonathan Berk and Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance 87-92
(2017). See also OECD transfer pricing guidelines, supra note 13, at para.
1.56.
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expected rate of return than it would require for a
low-risk activity. Second, the actual profits that
result from a risky activity will be highly volatile
19
depending on how the risk plays out. If the risk
is managed well, there may be a significant
increase in profits; but if a catastrophic risk
materializes, profits can quickly turn to losses.
II. Transfer Pricing Rules
A. Regulations Under Section 482
As previously noted, U.S. transfer pricing law
is governed by section 482. Section 482 itself
consists of only three sentences, but it is
supplemented by hundreds of pages of
regulations. The first sentence of section 482 gives
the IRS broad authority to “distribute, apportion,
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among [related parties] . . .
if necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any of such” parties.
Nearly identical language has been part of the code
20
since 1928. Although section 482 itself does not
indicate what standard should be applied to
determine if income is clearly reflected, the 1935
regulations explicitly confirmed that the arm’s21
length standard should apply.
Without providing a comprehensive
overview of the regulations under section 482,
some key aspects are worth describing here.
Other aspects will be introduced later in the
report when they are relevant to the discussion.
As noted, the regulations equate section 482’s
clear reflection of income requirement with the
arm’s-length standard. The regulations state the
standard in unequivocal terms:
In determining the true taxable income of
a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be
applied in every case is that of a taxpayer
dealing at arm’s length with an
uncontrolled taxpayer. A controlled
transaction meets the arm’s length
19

See, e.g., OECD transfer pricing guidelines, supra note 13, at para.

1.56.

standard if the results of the transaction
are consistent with the results that would
have been realized if uncontrolled
taxpayers had engaged in the same
transaction under the same circumstances
22
(arm’s length result). [Emphasis added.]
Note that this standard is based on a
hypothetical: A related-party transaction is arm’s
length if the results are consistent with what they
would have been if the transaction had occurred
between independent parties. The regulation goes
on to say that this hypothetical will “generally” be
determined by reference to comparable
transactions,23 but — contrary to what Medtronic’s
24
lawyers would have us believe — comparable
transactions are not necessary.
A central feature of the regulatory scheme is
25
the best method rule. The regulations provide
specific arm’s-length methods for each type of
26
related-party transaction. In choosing which
method to apply to a particular transaction, the
method that provides the most reliable measure
of an arm’s-length result must be applied.27 For
transactions involving intangible property (such
as the Medtronic license), the regulations provide
three specified methods28:
• the comparable uncontrolled transaction
method;29
30
• the comparable profits method; and

22

Reg. section 1.482-1(b)(1). A few definitions are needed to fully
understand this provision: The term “taxpayer” refers to any person or
enterprise, whether or not subject to tax; “controlled taxpayer” refers to
a taxpayer that is transacting with a related party (i.e., a party under
common control); “uncontrolled taxpayer” refers to a taxpayer that is
transacting with an unrelated party; “controlled transaction” refers to a
transaction between related parties; and “uncontrolled transaction”
refers to a transaction between independent parties. Reg. section 1.4821(i).
23

See, e.g., Pretrial Memorandum by Petitioner at 40, T.C. Memo.
2016-112 (Dec. 19, 2014) (No. 006944-11) (“The Commissioner’s
methodology . . . rests on the notion that the profits to which [Medtronic
US] and [MPROC] ‘should be’ entitled rule the day, rather than the
actual prices that uncontrolled entities pay in the real world for similar
intangible property.”) (Emphasis in original.).
25
26

20

Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, section 45 (cited and quoted in
Conrad Turley, David Chamberlain, and Mario Petriccione, A New Dawn
for the International Tax System 232 (2017)).
21

“Regulations Relating to the Income Tax Under the Revenue Act of
1934,” article 45-1(b) (1935), cited and quoted in Turley, Chamberlain,
and Petriccione, supra note 20, at 233.
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Reg. section 1.482-1(b)(1).

24

27
28
29
30

Reg. section 1.482-1(c).
Reg. section 1.482-1(b)(2).
Reg. section 1.482-1(c)(1).
Reg. section 1.482-4(a).
Described in reg. section 1.482-4(c).
Described in reg. section 1.482-5.
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31

• the profit-split method.

Further, an unspecified method may be used
if it provides the most reliable measure of the
32
arm’s-length result.
The CUT method determines whether a
license between related parties is arm’s length by
comparing it with one or more licenses between
33
independent parties. That is, the royalty rate in
the comparable license would be used as a
benchmark for the rate in the related-party
license. The regulations provide that the CUT
method will generally be the best method if the
transactions involve the same intangible property
transferred under substantially the same
34
circumstances. Obviously, this is a very high bar.
The CUT method may nonetheless be the best
method if it satisfies several comparability
35
factors. Arguably, as discussed later in the
critical analysis of the Tax Court’s decision in
36
Medtronic, these factors also set quite a high bar
— especially the requirement for similar profit
37
potential.
CPM assesses whether an enterprise that
engages in related-party transactions (the tested
party) earns the same level of profits as
independent companies that are comparable to
38
that enterprise. To qualify as a comparable
company, a company must not itself have
transactions with related parties. Because all of
the comparable companies’ transactions are
actually arm’s length, the implication is that the
tested party’s transactions — in aggregate — meet
the arm’s-length standard if the tested party’s
operating profit is consistent with the comparable
companies’ operating profits. Profit levels are
measured by financial ratios, such as operating
margin (operating profit/revenue) or return on

39

assets (operating profit/operating assets). To be
comparable, a company generally must
undertake similar functions, bear similar risks,
and use similar assets; however, the degree of
comparability required for CPM is generally less
40
than for other transfer pricing methods. To
compensate for the relaxed comparability
standards, CPM is generally applied by
comparing the tested party’s results against a
range of results from multiple comparable
companies.41
The profit-split method evaluates whether the
allocation of combined profit attributable to one
or more related-party transactions is arm’s length
by reference to the relative value of each party’s
contribution.42 The regulations provide for two
separate variants of the profit-split method: the
comparable profit-split method and the residual
profit-split method (RPSM).43 Only RPSM is
44
routinely used in practice. RPSM involves a twostep process:
• First, each of the related parties is allocated
income for its routine contributions, such as
the functions it performs and the tangible
assets it uses. This will normally involve the
application of CPM, treating each party as
45
the tested party in turn.
• Then, any residual profit or loss associated
with the parties’ nonroutine contributions,
such as valuable intangible assets, is split
between the parties in proportion to the
46
relative value of those contributions.

39
40

Reg. section 1.482-5(b)(4).
Reg. section 1.482-5(c)(2)(ii).

41

Reg. section 1.482-5(b)(3). More specifically, the range that is used is
narrower than the full range of results in order to improve comparability
by eliminating outliers. Reg. section 1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(B). Under the
regulations, taxpayers typically use the interquartile range, which is the
range from the 25th percentile to 75th percentile of results. Reg. section
1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(C).

31

Described in reg. section 1.482-6.

32

Reg. section 1.482-4(a)(4) and (d).

33

Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(1). The regulation describes the method in
more general terms, such that it encompasses lump sum purchases of
intangible property in addition to licenses. This report focuses on the
license situation because a license is at issue in Medtronic.
34

Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(ii).

35

Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii).

36

See infra text accompanying notes 153 to 167.

37

Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(ii) (similar profit potential
requirement).

42
43

Reg. section 1.482-6(c)(1).

44

The comparable profit split requires finding financial data from
two independent parties regarding the split of profits they earn from
joint activities. Reg. section 1.482-6(c)(2). Even when it is possible to find
independent parties engaging in joint activities that are comparable to
the related parties, reliable financial data on the split of income between
the two independent parties is extremely unlikely to be publicly
available.
45

38

Reg. section 1.482-5(b)(1) and (2). For discussion of the selection of
the tested party, see infra text accompanying note 47.

Reg. section 1.482-6(a).

46

Reg. section 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(A).
Reg. section 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(B).
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One way of looking at the relationship
between CPM and RPSM is that the former is a
special case of the latter, applicable when only one
of the parties makes nonroutine contributions. In
this special case, all of the residual profit is
allocated to the party making nonroutine
contributions. If it can be shown that the party
that only makes routine contributions earns an
arm’s-length profit, it logically follows that the
other party’s profits (or losses) are also arm’s
length. This is the reason that the regulations
provide that the tested party in a CPM analysis
should ordinarily be the least complex party and
not own any valuable intangible property.47
For both the CUT method and CPM,
adjustments can be made to comparable prices or
48
profits to improve the reliability of the analysis.
The regulations provide no guidance on
appropriate adjustments in applying the CUT
49
method. For CPM, guidance is provided for
adjustments related to accounting methods and
50
payment terms. In any event, as the number and
magnitude of adjustments increase, a method will
be considered less reliable for purposes of
51
determining the best method.
B. Guidance on Risk
The regulations do not provide a framework
for incorporating risk in the selection and
application of transfer pricing methods. Other
than brief guidance in connection with cost52
sharing arrangements, the regulations address
risk solely in provisions that govern
comparability.53 For example, in assessing
whether a license agreement is comparable to a
related-party license, the allocation of risk
between the licensor and the licensee would be a
relevant consideration. Similarly, when applying
CPM, the level of risk borne by a potentially

comparable company could be compared with
that borne by the tested party.
The regulations provide that the
determination of which related party bears a
particular risk will be made by analyzing the
54
relevant contractual terms. The allocation of risk
specified in a contract between the parties will
generally be respected if it is consistent with
55
economic substance. In considering economic
substance, the regulations provide that the
following facts are relevant:
1. whether the pattern of conduct by the
parties over time is consistent with the
56
purported allocation of risk;
2. whether the party that purportedly bears
the risk has financial capacity to fund
losses that might be expected to occur if
the risk materializes;57 and
3. the extent to which the party that
purportedly bears the risk exercises
managerial or operational control over the
business activities giving rise to the risk.58
But what if there is no contract between the
parties that specifies the allocation of a particular
risk? The regulations provide that the IRS may
impute a contractual agreement between the
parties consistent with the economic substance of
the transaction, giving greatest weight to the
conduct of the parties and their respective legal
59
rights.
In an international context, the OECD transfer
pricing guidelines contain a much more extensive
treatment of the role of risk in transfer pricing.
The most recent edition of the guidelines was
released in 2017. It represents the culmination of
several updates that came out of the base erosion
and profit-shifting project undertaken by the
OECD at the behest of the G-20. The BEPS project
was an extremely ambitious project that sought to

47

Reg. section 1.482-5(b)(2)(i).

48

Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(2).

49

The only relevant guidance is that, for circumstances to be
considered substantially the same, there can be only minor differences
that have “a definite and reasonably ascertainable effect” and “for which
appropriate adjustments can be made.” Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(ii).

54
55

50

Reg. section 1.482-5(c)(2)(iv).

56

51

Reg. section 1.482-1(c)(2)(i).

57

52

Reg. section 1.482-7(g)(1)(ii) and (4).

58

53

Comparability is covered in reg. section 1.482-1(d). Comparability
of risk in particular is covered in reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii).

1376

59

Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B).
Id.
Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B)(1).
Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B)(2).
Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B)(3).
Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2).
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rationalize and update a wide range of
international tax rules. In the transfer pricing area,
the OECD sought to make sure transfer pricing
60
outcomes are aligned with value creation. The
treatment of risk is an area in which the BEPS
revisions were extensive.
As noted, under the U.S. regulations, the third
factor for determining which related party bears a
risk is “the extent to which the party that
purportedly bears the risk exercises managerial or
operational control over the business activities
61
giving rise to the risk.” The regulation adds the
following gloss: “In arm’s length dealings, parties
ordinarily bear a greater share of those risks over
62
which they have relatively more control.” The
OECD transfer pricing guidelines took this rather
tepid endorsement of aligning risk with risk
control functions and made it the central premise
of the provisions on risk.
The OECD transfer pricing guidelines
establish a six-step process for analyzing risk in
related-party transactions:
1. risks must be identified with specificity;
2. the contractual allocation of risks must be
determined;
3. the extent to which each party undertakes
risk control functions and has the financial
ability to assume risks must be
determined;
4. an analysis must be undertaken to
determine whether the parties actually
follow the contract that allocates the risk
and whether the party that assumes a risk
under the contract exercises control over
the risk and has financial capacity to bear
it;
5. if it is found that the conditions in step 4 are
not satisfied, risks must be reallocated
accordingly; and

6. transfer prices must be set, analyzed, or
adjusted in accordance with the proper
allocation of risks (whether allocated by
the original contract or reallocated under
step 5).63
The heart of the OECD’s six-step process lies
in steps 4 and 5. Steps 4 and 5 essentially require
that risk be allocated to a party that exercises
control over activities taken to manage or mitigate
the risk. If the party does not perform risk control
functions, the contractual allocation of risk will be
ignored and the risk will be reallocated to a party
that does control these functions. According to the
guidelines, control over risk involves making
“decisions to take on, lay off, or decline a riskbearing opportunity” as well as making
“decisions on whether and how to respond to the
64
risks associated with the opportunity.”
Obviously, this is a more elaborate approach
than the U.S. regulations’ treatment of risk as a
comparability factor. However, the guidance on
how to actually set or adjust transfer prices (step
6) is still insufficient. Section IV of this report
offers some thoughts on how this step might be
undertaken.
III. Medtronic
Let us turn now to Medtronic, which shines a
light on many different issues involving the
allocation of risk within a multinational group of
companies. This section is organized in such a
way that we can work our way through the case
factually and procedurally and understand the
relevant issues.65
A. Medtronic US and MPROC
During 2005 and 2006, the years at issue in the
case, Medtronic was the world’s leading maker of
pacemakers and a leader in the production of
other medical devices. The pacemakers and other
products produced by Medtronic were classified
by the Food and Drug Administration as Class III
medical devices. Because Class III medical
devices are highly complex, implanted in the

60

For a rather jaundiced view of the BEPS project and the concept of
value creation, see Mindy Herzfeld, “The Case Against BEPS: Lessons
for Tax Coordination,” 21 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2017).

63
64

61

Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B)(3).

62

Id.

OECD transfer pricing guidelines, supra note 13, at para. 1.60.
Id. at para. 1.65.

65

Unless otherwise noted, the facts of the case are drawn from the
Tax Court’s opinion, T.C. Memo. 2016-112.
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body, and used to sustain or support human life,
they are the most highly regulated type of devices
and are subject to an approval process spanning
five to 10 years.
Medtronic was the parent of the Medtronic
group, and Medtronic USA Inc. was its wholly
owned U.S. subsidiary. (Together, these
66
companies will be referred to as Medtronic US. )
Medtronic US had responsibility for all research
and development activities and for undertaking
clinical studies required to obtain FDA approval.
It was also responsible for manufacturing key
components that were the most critical and
67
sophisticated parts of the products. Further,
Medtronic US performed all U.S. sales and
marketing functions, including maintenance of
crucial relationships with physicians.
Medtronic Puerto Rico Operations Co.
(MPROC) was incorporated in the Cayman
Islands in August 2001. The Cayman Islands is a
68
tax haven that does not tax corporate income.
Although Medtronic began manufacturing
operations in Puerto Rico in the 1970s, the
business was conducted by two U.S. subsidiaries
that had elected preferential tax treatment under
section 936. When Congress announced in 2001
that it would phase out section 936, Medtronic
restructured by having these U.S. subsidiaries
transfer all their assets to MPROC and having
MPROC continue to conduct their businesses
through Puerto Rican branches. During 2005 and
2006 MPROC paid no Puerto Rican income taxes
on so-called pioneer products and paid Puerto
Rican income taxes at a 2 percent rate on all other
products.

66

The Tax Court objected to the IRS grouping Medtronic Inc. and
Medtronic USA Inc. together in its briefs because each company was
involved in different transactions with MPROC. Id. at *74 n.6.
Specifically, Medtronic Inc. sold components and licensed intangibles to
MPROC, while Medtronic USA Inc. purchased finished products from
MPROC for resale to customers. However, to keep the case description
to manageable length and avoid undue confusion, grouping them
together as “Medtronic US” is appropriate here.
67

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 74. One of the components is the
“hybrid,” which the IRS describes as the “brains of the Device”: “It
contains the pacing agent, the central command microprocessor, the
charging circuit, and all other electrical components that direct the
operations of the Devices.” Id.
68

See “The Cayman Islands and Offshore Tax Issues: Hearing before
the S. Comm. on Finance,” 110th Cong. 5 (2008) (statement by Michael
Brostek, director, tax issues, Government Accountability Office).
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Although Medtronic US was responsible for
many functions in the value chain, MPROC’s sole
responsibility was final product manufacturing.
MPROC purchased key components and licensed
intangible property from Medtronic US, used
these components and intangibles to manufacture
finished products, and then sold virtually all these
products back to Medtronic US for sale to end69
customers. MPROC’s manufacturing operations
were sophisticated, involving both intensive
manual work by line employees (approximately
70 to 75 percent of a workforce of nearly 2,300
employees) as well as higher-level efforts of
trained engineers who were, among other things,
“involved with project implementation,
technology harvesting, and process
development.”
MPROC also undertook a wide range of
quality control activities, which the Tax Court
described in great detail. In its pretrial briefs,
Medtronic argued that manufacturing quality
was far and away the most important value driver
in its business.70 The Tax Court largely accepted
this argument, stating:
Respondent [the IRS] does not place
enough emphasis on the importance of
quality in the industry. The final product is
the key to success. Product quality is the
foundation for which implantable medical
devices can be successful. . . . A company
can have a strong sales force and a creative
marketing department, but these will not
make a difference if the underlying
71
product is unsafe and ineffective.
In actuality, the IRS did put a significant
emphasis on quality in its briefs. However, it
considered quality more broadly than just
finished product manufacturing and emphasized
Medtronic US’s role in ensuring quality on a
72
companywide basis.
69

MPROC also had a very small amount of sales to third parties in
Central and South America and the Caribbean.
70
71

See, e.g., Pretrial Memorandum of Petitioner, supra note 24, at 16.
T.C. Memo. 2016-112 at *102.

72

In its opening brief, the IRS writes: “Every Medtronic employee
was focused on quality, which included quality product designs, quality
manufacture of components and finished products, quality service to
customers, and quality collaboration with outside organizations.”
Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 11.
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As noted at the outset of this report, the Tax
Court’s decision resulted in the level of MPROC’s
profits being extremely high compared with other
73
potential standards. Because the Tax Court relied
on a transfer pricing method that did not
benchmark profits directly, it is impossible to
know conclusively whether the court attributed
MPROC’s profitability primarily to the value of its
functions concerning manufacturing quality or to
another factor, such as risk. It is worth noting that
manufacturing quality and product liability risk
are closely correlated. The Eighth Circuit
concluded that risk was the most important factor
in the Tax Court’s decision.74
The transactions that were central to the Tax
Court case were three agreements under which
Medtronic US licensed specific intangible
property to MPROC for use in its manufacturing
business.75 These agreements would result in
MPROC earning profits that could vary
significantly depending on how risks played out.
The three licenses were a devices license, a leads
license, and a trademark license. (Devices and
leads were the two types of products that MPROC
manufactured.) As initially structured, all three
licenses provided for MPROC to pay Medtronic
US royalties as a percentage of intercompany
sales. The rates were 29 percent under the devices
license, 15 percent under the leads license, and 8
76
percent under the trademark license.
The rates under the devices license and the
leads license were subsequently increased (to 44
percent and to 26 percent, respectively) as a result
of an agreement between Medtronic and the IRS
77
during an audit of Medtronic’s 2002 tax return.
These rates were based on a profit-split analysis
73

See supra text accompanying notes 8 to 9.

and were adjusted when the profit split fell
outside of a specified range. Medtronic filed its
2005 and 2006 tax returns consistently with the
2002 agreement, but it argued in the Tax Court
that the original rates were arm’s length — and the
rates in the 2002 agreement were not — and
therefore asked for a refund of overpaid taxes.
B. Role of Intangible Property
Intangible property was extremely important
to Medtronic’s success. In its filings with the SEC
for 2006, Medtronic identified its top strength as
“broad and deep technological knowledge of
microelectronics, implantable devices and . . .
related areas, as well as a tradition of
technological pioneering and breakthrough
products that not only yield better medical
78
outcomes, but more cost-effective therapies.”
Intangible property will generally be reflected
in high levels of R&D expense. In 2005 and 2006
Medtronic’s R&D expense was equal to nearly 10
percent of its revenue, virtually all of it incurred
79
by Medtronic US. To be sure, R&D activity does
not necessarily produce valuable intangible
property — it is the epitome of a risky activity that
may result in failure. However, Medtronic’s
industry-leading profit margins make clear that
its R&D was successful and that its intangible
assets were very valuable.
External analysts also identify innovation and
intellectual property as the dominant value
drivers in the medical device industry. A March
2007 report by the U.S. International Trade
80
Commission is representative. In the chapter
titled “Principal Competitive Factors,” the first
factor identified is “innovation, research and
81
development, and intellectual property.” The
report states:

74

See infra quotation accompanying note 170.

75

The parties also entered into two other agreements: a components
supply agreement and a distribution agreement. Both agreements
allowed Medtronic US to earn a “routine” margin on its activities (i.e.,
supply of components to MPROC and sale of products to endcustomers). The Tax Court noted that IRS experts did not challenge the
arm’s-length nature of these transactions. That is essentially correct if it is
understood that the IRS intended the royalty adjustments to compensate
Medtronic US for intangibles related to components and marketing as
well as to the intangibles explicitly covered by the licenses. See
Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 143-144. For purposes of this report, those
complexities can be ignored.
76

The trademark royalty applied to total sales of both devices and
leads.
77

This was the so-called memorandum of understanding.

78

Medtronic Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (June 28, 2006).

79

In 2006, on net sales of $11.292 billion, Medtronic spent $1.113
billion on R&D (9.86 percent); in 2005, on net sales of $10.055 billion, it
spent $951 million on R&D (9.46 percent). Id. Exhibit 13 at 34. According
to the IRS, MPROC’s share of Medtronic’s R&D spending was a fraction
of 1 percent (0.2 percent). Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second
Amended Simultaneous Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 32.
80

U.S. International Trade Commission Publication 3909, “Medical
Devices and Equipment: Competitive Conditions Affecting U.S. Trade in
Japan and Other Principal Foreign Markets” (Mar. 2007).
81

Id. at 2-1.
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Innovation and a strong commitment to
R&D are principal competitive factors for
this industry and were the factors most
frequently cited as critical to firm success.
The medical device industry is R&Dintensive, driven by constant innovation
82
and short product life cycles.
Medtronic US was responsible for virtually all
R&D activity and owned virtually all the
intangible property within the Medtronic group.
MPROC’s contribution to R&D was limited to
input on whether Medtronic US’s designs could
83
be manufactured at commercial scale.
Indeed, in its Tax Court briefs, Medtronic
emphatically denied that MPROC owned any
intangible assets when it was formed in August
2001, a mere four years before the years at issue.
As noted earlier, although Medtronic had
manufacturing operations in Puerto Rico
beginning in 1974, those operations were
84
conducted by U.S. subsidiaries of Medtronic Inc.
MPROC came into existence in 2001 when these
subsidiaries transferred all their assets to MPROC
in a transaction that was tax free under then85
applicable law. That is, the transfer was tax free
regarding tangible assets used in an active trade
or business. If these assets had included any
intangible assets, the transfer of those assets
would have been taxable under the deemed
86
royalty rule of section 367(d). It is for this reason
that Medtronic emphasized that all intangibles
82

Id. at 2-1 to 2-2 (citations omitted).

were owned by Medtronic US and not transferred
to MPROC.87 This would necessarily include any
know-how concerning the Puerto Rican
88
manufacturing operations.
Nonetheless, Medtronic did argue in its brief
to the Eighth Circuit that MPROC possessed “selfdeveloped know-how and intellectual property
89
obtained via the Licenses.” The Tax Court
appears to have accepted this argument regarding
the licensed intangibles.90 As for know-how, any
incremental know-how developed between
August 2001 and 2005-2006 would be minor
compared with manufacturing know-how
developed between 1967 and 2001 that Medtronic
conceded belonged to Medtronic US. As for
obtaining intangibles through the licenses, this
argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The
valuable intangibles that were licensed continued
to belong to Medtronic US. The intangible that
91
MPROC owned was the license itself. A license
can have value if, because of changes in
circumstances, the royalty rate specified in the
license proves to be lower than would be
negotiated if the changed circumstances were
taken into account. Medtronic has not argued that
circumstances changed between August 2001 and
2005-2006, so no significant value should be
attributed to the license.
C. Role of Risk
Risk played a central but elusive role in
Medtronic. Neither Medtronic nor the IRS made
explicit arguments that satisfactorily explained
how their transfer pricing methods addressed

83

Absent a contract giving MPROC partial ownership rights in the
intangibles developed, ownership of the intangibles — and therefore the
right to earn premium profits from exploiting them — belonged solely to
Medtronic US because it was the legal owner of the IP rights and had
primary control over the use of the intangible property. Reg. section
1.482-4(f)(3).
84

See Section III.A.

85

Transfers of property to a domestic corporation controlled by the
transferor in exchange for stock are generally tax free under section 351.
However, under section 367(a), transfers to a foreign corporation
(including a Puerto Rican corporation) do not qualify for tax-free
treatment unless specific exceptions apply. In 2001 section 367(a)(3)
provided such an exception for transfers of tangible assets used in the
active conduct of a foreign trade or business. (This exception was
repealed at the end of 2017.) Medtronic’s transfers of business assets
qualified for this exception, and therefore the transaction was tax free.
86

Section 367(d) provides that the transfer of intangible property to a
foreign corporation in exchange for stock will be treated as though the
transferor had sold the intangible property for a series of annual
payments that are commensurate with the income attributable to the
intangible. The regulations in effect in 2001 contained an exception for
transfers of “foreign goodwill and going-concern value,” but Medtronic
did not rely on that exception.
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87

The IRS had made an alternative argument to the effect that if the
court found that the royalties were arm’s length, MPROC’s high level of
profitability indicated that Medtronic US must have transferred
intangibles to MPROC under section 367(d). It is entertaining to read
Medtronic waxing eloquent in its pretrial briefs about how Medtronic US
owned all valuable intangibles even as it was trying to defend MPROC’s
impressive profits. See, e.g., Pretrial Memorandum of Petitioner, supra
note 24, at 59.
88

The definition of intangible property in the code specifically
includes know-how. See section 367(d)(4)(A). The predecessor to section
367(d)(4), effective before tax reform in late 2017 under the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act, was section 936(h)(3). Although the TCJA made some changes
to the provision (such as explicitly including goodwill in the definition
of intangible property), there was no change to the language regarding
know-how.
89

Brief for the Appellee at 34, Medtronic, 900 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2017)
(No. 17-1866).
90
91

T.C. Memo. 2016-112 at *114.
See reg. section 1.482-4(f)(3)(i) and (ii), Example 1.
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92

risk. The Eighth Circuit summed up Medtronic’s
argument as being that MPROC was entitled to
the impressive profits it earned because it bore
93
“the lion’s share of potential liability.” Because
the Tax Court failed to make an explicit finding
about the nature and extent of risks borne by
MPROC, the Eighth Circuit specifically
demanded that the Tax Court do so on
94
reconsideration of the case.
One of the most significant risks in the
medical device industry is the risk of product
liability claims and product recalls as the result of
product defects. Echoing Medtronic’s argument,
the Tax Court observed that MPROC’s
manufacturing process “is very different from
manufacturing electronic equipment such as a cell
phone. If a cell phone malfunctions, the consumer
could be inconvenienced; if a device or lead
malfunctions, the consumer could die.”95
Although the Tax Court focused on MPROC’s
role as manufacturer, defects in the design of
products — which were the responsibility of
Medtronic US — appear to be a significantly
greater source of product liability in the medical
device industry.96 According to the IRS, the two
major product liability cases faced by Medtronic
in the early 2000s (the Fidelis leads and the
Marquis devices) were both the result of design
97
defects. Indeed, although the claim was disputed
by the Tax Court, the IRS maintained that both
products “met all manufacturing specifications.”98
In its briefs, Medtronic placed great emphasis
on the argument that MPROC bore primary
responsibility for product liability risks “as the
92

In its Tax Court briefs, the IRS stated: “Although not explicitly,
petitioner appears to resort to arguing that Medtronic’s product liability
risk can justify some undefined portion of petitioner’s profit allocation to
MPROC.” Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended
Simultaneous Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 169-170 and 265.
93

900 F.3d at 611.

94

See infra quotation accompanying note 170.

95

T.C. Memo. 2016-112 at *105.

manufacturer directly liable under common
law.”99 Medtronic also emphasized that MPROC
agreed to be “liable for all costs and damages
arising from recalls and product defects” in the
devices and leads licenses.100
On remand, the Tax Court should address the
following issues regarding the magnitude and
allocation of product liability risk:
• The magnitude of Medtronic’s potential
liability. Medtronic’s liability is limited by
the federal preemption doctrine, which
precludes injured patients from pursuing
state law claims for negligence in design if
101
the product received FDA approval.
Notably, a “narrow category” of claims for
failure to manufacture products according
to FDA-approved specifications are not
precluded.102 The court needs to determine
whether the potential liability was truly in
the billions of dollars, as Medtronic
103
asserted, or significantly less.
• The common law doctrine of apparent
manufacturer. Even though manufacturing
defects are not subject to federal
preemption, Medtronic US would almost
certainly be fully liable under this doctrine
because the products are sold under its
trademark, are based on its designs and lack
markings indicating MPROC is the
104
manufacturer.
• The effect of common law principles of
indemnity and contribution. Absent
contractual indemnification, product
liability is apportioned among parties in the
distribution chain in proportion to their
105
culpability. So, for example, Medtronic US
would bear full liability for any

99

Petitioner’s Revised Redacted Simultaneous Opening Brief at 216,
T.C. Memo. 2016-112 (June 30, 2016) (No. 006944-11).
100

Id.

101

96

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 127.
97

Id. at 126-127.

In re Medtronic, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-1152.

102

Id. at 1152 (quoting Stevens v. Pacesetter Inc., No. 3:07-cv-3812
(D.S.C. 2008)).
103

98

Id. The Tax Court disputed this characterization, finding that the
“Fidelis quality problems involved both design and manufacturing.”
T.C. Memo. 2016-112 at *64. However, in product liability litigation over
the Fidelis leads, the district court concluded that even if MPROC’s
welding was at fault (as alleged by the plaintiffs), the welding was
compliant with the FDA’s good manufacturing practices and quality
system regulation. In re Medtronic Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products, 592 F.
Supp. 2d 1147, 1157-1158 (D. Minn. 2009).

Petitioner’s Revised Redacted Simultaneous Opening Brief, supra
note 99, at 116.
104

See Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended
Simultaneous Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 266-267 (citing Torres v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 F.2d 939, 942 (Ariz. 1990); and
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability section 14, cmt. d).
105

See id. at 268-269 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Apportionment of Liability sections 22 and 23).
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manufacturing defect in the components
supplied by it.
• Enforceability of MPROC’s contractual
assumption of liability under Minnesota
law. The IRS argued that the intercompany
agreements between Medtronic US and
MPROC failed to meet the relevant
standard.106
• Whether MPROC’s assumption of liability
had economic substance under the section
482 regulations. For a contractual term
purporting to allocate risk to be accepted for
transfer pricing purposes, the following
considerations are relevant: (1) pattern of
conduct; (2) financial capacity to fund
potential losses; and (3) managerial or
operational control over risk management
107
activities. The IRS argued that Medtronic’s
allocation of risk to MPROC failed all three
considerations.108
Regarding controlling risk management
activities, as discussed in Section II, the OECD
transfer pricing guidelines now give special
priority to this factor in determining the allocation
109
of risk between related parties. I would argue
that a detailed analysis of this factor is
appropriate under the existing regulations as
well, but I recognize that the Tax Court may not
110
give it a prominent role in the risk assessment.
In Medtronic’s case, MPROC performed quality
control activities for finished product
manufacturing, subject to standard-setting and
oversight by Medtronic US, but it had no control
at all over other significant sources of risk. These
other risks included risks related to development
and design, protection and defense of patents,
manufacturing of components, and liaison with
doctors and hospitals during the device
implantation process.
The transfer pricing guidelines do not
explicitly explain the theoretical basis for
requiring that risks be allocated to the risk

controller, but professor Wolfgang Schoen has
identified one potential basis:
An arm’s length argument might run as
follows: the party which is not able to
control the risk would have to seek
compensation for assuming the risk which
would be higher than the respective cost
incurred by the other party — the “least
111
cost-avoider” — in the first place.
Schoen ultimately rejects this rationale,
writing:
On the contrary, a great deal of contractual
instruments between independent parties
are meant to shift risk away from the
person closest to the risk in order to reach
efficiency. One such major case is
insurance (for example, car insurance or
health insurance): while it is evident that
the insured person is much closer to the
risk and controls it in many cases, to a
limited extent, the economic benefit of
diversification has led to the
establishment of insurance companies all
over the world who hardly control any
112
risk they insure.
This argument has some superficial appeal.
However, on closer reflection it is clear that
MPROC did not behave like an insurance
company in any respect. It had no expertise in
insurance activities and did not have any means
113
of pooling or diversifying risks. This is likely to
be the case in most related-party contexts,
undermining Schoen’s argument significantly.
Regarding the financial capacity to bear risk,
Schoen has also addressed this concern — in a line
of argument that is much stronger, in my view. He
points out that if a risk materializes that gives rise
to costs that are greater than those that the
purported risk-bearer can bear, the risk and costs
will automatically “fall back on the insured
person.”114 In Medtronic’s case, MPROC’s entire

106

See id. at 271 (citing, inter alia, National Hydro Systems v. M.A.
Mortenson Co., 529 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. 1995)).
107

Reg. section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B).

Id. (text accompanying Schoen’s note 79).

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 273-277.
110

See supra text accompanying notes 62 to 64.
See infra text accompanying note 170.
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Schoen, supra note 15 (text accompanying Schoen’s note 76).

112

108

109

111

113

The IRS made the same argument in its briefs. See Respondent’s
Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous Opening Brief, supra
note 8, at 275-276.
114

Schoen, supra note 15, at section 4.2.2.3 (capacity to bear risk).
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net equity (assets minus liabilities) at the start of
2005 and 2006 was $410 million and $480 million,
115
respectively. If the Tax Court accepts
Medtronic’s claim that the potential liability is in
the magnitude of billions of dollars, this level of
capitalization calls into question the economic
substance of MPROC’s purported risk bearing.
Ultimately, despite skepticism about many of
Medtronic’s claims, I am agnostic as to the
magnitude and allocation of risk in Medtronic’s
case. There is a great range of possible findings.
What is important is that the Tax Court be able to
tailor its resolution of the transfer pricing issues to
whatever findings it makes. As noted in Section II,
neither the U.S. regulations nor the OECD
transfer pricing guidelines offer much help to the
Tax Court in this regard. Hopefully, the
observations in Section IV provide some
assistance.
D. IRS’s Position: CPM
1. Description of position.
In the Tax Court proceedings, the IRS argued
that the amount of the total royalties MPROC paid
to Medtronic was grossly understated — by more
than $700 million in 2005 and more than $1.1
116
billion in 2006. In arriving at this conclusion, the
IRS applied CPM.117 To apply CPM, the IRS
aggregated all the transactions between
Medtronic US and MPROC and compared the
bottom-line operating profit earned by MPROC
against the profits earned by companies it
considered comparable to MPROC. The IRS
calculated the level of profits MPROC should
have earned under the arm’s-length standard by
multiplying the average value of MPROC’s
operating assets by the median return on assets
118
earned by these comparable companies.

Typically, it is necessary to aggregate all of a
company’s transactions within a line of business
to apply CPM because the operating profits from
that line of business must be compared against the
operating profits earned by comparable
companies. In MPROC’s case, there was only one
line of business: It purchased components from
Medtronic US, used those components and
intangible property licensed from Medtronic US
to assemble final products, and then sold the
finished product back to Medtronic US. Because
the IRS did not believe sufficiently comparable
transactions could be found for all these
transactions but did believe reasonably
comparable companies could be found for the line
of business, it chose CPM as the transfer pricing
method under the best method test. MPROC was
chosen as the tested party to apply CPM because
it performed fewer functions, owned no valuable
intangible property, and bore fewer risks than
119
Medtronic US.
IRS expert Michael Heimert used Compustat to
find comparable companies.120 Compustat is a
commercially available database that compiles
information filed with the SEC by public
companies. Heimert narrowed the set of potential
companies to those identified by standard
industrial code 384 (surgical, medical, and dental
instruments and supplies).121 He then applied
various quantitative and qualitative screens to
identify 14 companies that he considered most
comparable to MPROC.122 The companies in
Heimert’s set were diversified medical device
manufacturers, many of which had full-fledged
research and marketing operations as well as
123
manufacturing.
Heimert selected return on assets as the profitlevel indicator because MPROC’s operations were
124
very dependent on manufacturing assets. The
125
range of results were :

115

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 274.
116

See id. at 151. The IRS determined that MPROC should have
earned an operating profit of $110.5 million in 2005 and $110.4 million in
2006 instead of the $828 million it earned in 2005 and the $1.273 billion it
earned in 2006. Id.
117

For a description of CPM, see supra text accompanying notes 38 to

41.

119

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 147.
120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 147-148.

123

Id. at 148.

118

For the Tax Court’s description of the IRS’s CPM analysis, see T.C.
Memo. 2016-112 at *89-*97. In subsequent footnotes, I will cite the IRS’s
own description of the analysis from its opening brief.

124

Id. at 150.

125

Id. at 150-151.
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• 2005: lower quartile = 22 percent; median =
28.1 percent; upper quartile = 39.9 percent.
• 2006: lower quartile = 21.7 percent; median =
26 percent; upper quartile = 39.3 percent.
Because MPROC’s results were significantly
above the upper quartile, Heimert based his
126
proposed adjustment on the median results.
Consistent with CPM, Heimert calculated total
royalty amounts for each year rather than directly
calculating royalty rates. These amounts
translated to the following royalty rates (as a
percentage of intercompany sales and as a
127
percentage of end customer sales) :
• 2005: 75.2 percent (intercompany sales); 49.4
percent (end-customer sales).
• 2006: 65.2 percent (intercompany sales); 58.9
percent (end-customer sales).
In comparing these royalty rates to those
adopted by the Tax Court, keep in mind that the
IRS’s rates combine the technology and trademark
licenses. That is, for comparison, the Tax Court’s
rates for intercompany sales (30 percent for
devices and 15 percent for leads) should be
increased by 8 percentage points to reflect the
trademark license.
The IRS argued that Heimert’s analysis
properly accounted for MPROC’s bearing of risk,
including product liability risk, because the
comparable companies were integrated medical
128
device manufacturers that bore similar risks.
2. Critical analysis.
There are several valid criticisms of the IRS’s
position. Even though the regulations specifically
authorize use of CPM for intangible property
transactions, there is serious question whether
CPM can ever be a reliable method for intangible
property transactions when the licensee agrees to

pay a royalty stated as a fixed percentage of
sales.129
First and foremost, CPM is not suitable for
benchmarking the returns of a tested party that
bears significant risk. Under CPM, the tested
party must earn a relatively fixed return (for
example, a return on assets within a narrow
range) regardless of how actual risks play out. To
ensure the tested party earns a fixed return —
approximately $110 million each year in
130
MPROC’s case under the IRS’s analysis — the
actual royalty rate must be allowed to fluctuate
from year to year.
As actually structured, the licenses at issue in
the case required MPROC to pay royalties at fixed
rates as a percentage of sales. Under the
regulations, the IRS must respect the structure of
the taxpayer’s transactions unless the structure
131
lacks economic substance. Even if it were
determined that MPROC did not bear any product
liability risk, this fixed-rate royalty structure in
itself resulted in MPROC bearing substantial risk.
In particular, if MPROC could not achieve
sufficient operating margins because of higherthan-expected costs or lower-than-expected sales,
the fixed-rate royalty could result in MPROC
incurring losses.
Another fundamental criticism of the IRS’s
position is also valid. The Tax Court criticized the
IRS’s selection of comparable companies on
grounds that the companies “own all of the
intangibles and bear all of the risks throughout the
entire value chain” rather than solely performing
132
manufacturing functions. The IRS’s expert argued
that this defect would have the effect of overstating
the return MPROC should earn and is therefore
conservative, but the court rightly rejected that
133
argument. Although the argument would tend to
be true due to comparable companies’ ownership

129

126

Id. at 151. The regulations provide that the IRS may make
adjustments to any point within the arm’s-length range but will
“ordinarily” adjust to the median. Reg. section 1.482-1(e)(3).
127

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 152. See also T.C. Memo. 2016-112 at *95
(reporting Heimert’s royalty rates as a percentage of end-customer sales).
128

Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second Amended Simultaneous
Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 170.

1384

Having said this, if there is a fact pattern in which CPM is the
appropriate method to evaluate an intercompany license, this could well
be it. The facts are remarkably similar to those in reg. section 1.482-5(e),
Example 4. Oddly, the Tax Court relied on Example 4 to conclude that
Medtronic US’s transactions should not be aggregated. See T.C. Memo.
2016-112 at *114-*115. This is odd because all the licensee’s transactions
in the example actually were aggregated in order to apply CPM.
130

See supra note 119.

131

Reg. section 1.482-1(f)(2)(ii).

132

T.C. Memo. 2016-112, at *111.

133

Id.
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of valuable intangibles, the arm’s-length return
would not necessarily be overstated because the
comparable companies may have earned lower
returns as a result of risks materializing. The IRS
was between a rock and a hard place here: If it had
chosen companies that solely performed
manufacturing functions, it would have been
accused of inappropriately treating MPROC as a
contract manufacturer rather than a risk-bearing
licensee, a smear that has lost the IRS many cases
throughout the years.134
E. Tax Court’s Approach: CUT Method
1. Description of opinion.
There are three steps in a court’s review of an
IRS adjustment under section 482. First, the court
considers the taxpayer’s challenge to the IRS’s
position. The IRS’s position is presumptively
correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of
proving that it is arbitrary, capricious, or
135
unreasonable. If the taxpayer carries this
burden, the court then considers whether the
taxpayer’s own position satisfies the arm’s-length
136
standard. If the court finds that neither side is
correct, the court finally must fashion its own
resolution to the case.137
The Tax Court did indeed find that the IRS’s
adjustments were arbitrary, capricious, or
138
unreasonable and therefore set them aside.
Having rejected the IRS’s position, the Tax Court
turned to Medtronic’s analysis. The court decided
that no adjustment should be made to the
trademark license, leaving only the devices and
leads licenses for closer consideration.139
Medtronic had argued that the best
comparable for a CUT method analysis of the

134

For discussion of the contract manufacturer line of cases, see
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation,” 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89, 117-127
(1995). Even though the IRS bent over backward to avoid being accused
of treating MPROC as a contract manufacturer, Medtronic did not
hesitate to characterize the IRS as doing just that. See Brief for the
Appellee, supra note 89, at 10.
135

T.C. Memo. 2016-112 at *85 (citing Sundstrand Corp. v.
Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 353-354 (1991)).
136

Id. at *86-*87 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 855, 860
(7th Cir. 1988)).
137

Id. at *87 (citing Veritas Software Corp. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297,
318 (2009)).
138
139

devices and leads licenses was the so-called
Pacesetter agreement. This was an agreement
between Medtronic and one of its competitors,
Siemens Pacesetter, which was a cross-license that
had been entered into in settlement of several
lawsuits involving patent, antitrust, and
140
employment issues. The royalty rate in the
agreement was 7 percent, but Medtronic’s expert
made some adjustments and argued that the
arm’s-length rate was between 16 and 17
percent.141 Although the Tax Court accepted both
the conclusion that the CUT method was the best
transfer pricing method and that the Pacesetter
agreement was the best comparable,142 the court
rejected Medtronic’s position because the
adjustments made by Medtronic were insufficient
and because royalty rates for devices and leads
143
were not separately determined.
Having rejected the positions of both the IRS
and Medtronic, the Tax Court turned to the task of
fashioning its own CUT method analysis. The
court calculated a royalty for the devices license
(stated as a percentage of end-customer sales) as
follows:
• Use the 7 percent royalty from the Pacesetter
144
agreement as the starting point.
• Double the royalty to 14 percent to account
for the fact that the intercompany licenses
were exclusive whereas the Pacesetter
145
agreement was not. This is the same
adjustment Medtronic made, but neither
Medtronic nor the court explained how it
was derived.
• Add 3 percentage points to account for the
fact that the intercompany licenses gave
MPROC access to improvements made by
Medtronic US whereas the Pacesetter
146
agreement did not. This was also an
adjustment that Medtronic had made, but
again no explanation was provided by either

140

Id. at *56-*59. See also Respondent’s Revised Redacted Second
Amended Simultaneous Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 256 (referring to
antitrust and employment issues).
141

T.C. Memo. 2016-112 at *123-*124.

142

Id. at *133-*134.

143

Id. at *124-*130.

144

Id. at *134.

145

Id. at *118.

Id.

146

Id. at *132.

Id.
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Medtronic or the court as to how it was
derived.
• Add 7 percentage points to account for
Medtronic US’s provision of know-how to
MPROC. The Tax Court explained that the
provision of know-how was “equivalent” to
exclusivity and therefore made an
adjustment of the same magnitude.147
• Add 3.5 percentage points to account for
differences in profit potential. The Tax Court
explained that it considered exclusivity and
know-how to have “a greater impact on the
value of the licenses” than profit potential
and therefore made an adjustment that was
half of the adjustment for each of those other
148
factors.
• Add 2.5 percentage points to account for the
greater scope of products (that is,
neurological as well as cardiac) in the
intercompany licenses. Because Medtronic’s
neurological business was not as large as the
cardiac business, the Tax Court concluded
that an adjustment equal to roughly onethird of the starting royalty was
149
appropriate.
As a result of these adjustments, the Tax Court
concluded that the arm’s-length royalty for the
devices license was 30 percent of end-customer
sales (the equivalent of a 44 percent royalty on
sales to Medtronic US).150
The Tax Court noted that Medtronic’s original
licenses provided for a 29 percent royalty for
devices and roughly half that amount (specifically
15 percent) for leads. Based on purported
differences in the profitability of devices and
leads, the court concluded that the royalty rates
for leads should be half those for licenses (that is,
15 percent of end-customer sales or 22 percent of
151
intercompany sales).
As previously noted, the Tax Court did not
make a finding regarding the level of risk borne
by MPROC. There was no discussion of risk in
connection with the CUT method analysis, either.

147
148
149
150
151

The implicit assumption would seem to be that
the level of risk borne by MPROC was comparable
to that borne by Pacesetter.
2. Critical analysis.
As noted at the outset of this report, the Tax
Court’s decision allowed MPROC to earn a return
on assets of 152 percent in 2005 and 218 percent in
2006, which was three to four times greater than
that earned by Medtronic as a whole (55
152
percent). In considering this disparity, keep in
mind that MPROC owned no significant
intangible assets. As argued later, my view is that
a CUT analysis that results in such a large
disparity in profitability (or profit potential)
cannot be considered reliable.153
Turning to the CUT analysis itself, there are
several shortcomings. Many were identified by
the IRS in its appellant brief to the Eighth Circuit,
and some of them were addressed by the Eighth
Circuit itself. The following paragraphs discuss
some of the most important ones.
a. Magnitude of adjustments.
The regulations specify that the number,
magnitude, and reliability of adjustments made in
the application of a transfer pricing method
greatly influence the determination of whether it
154
is the best method. In this case, the reliability of
the adjustments is called into question by the lack
155
of explanation for their derivation. The
magnitude of the adjustments is also problematic:
Taken together, for the devices license, the
adjustments increased the royalty from 7 percent
156
to 30 percent, more than a 400 percent increase.

152

See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

153

More accurately, my view is that a CUT analysis that results in
such a large disparity in ex ante expected profits cannot be considered
reliable. Although such a disparity could result from differences
between ex ante and ex post profits resulting from how risks play out, it
does not appear that MPROC’s results could be justified on this basis
given, among other reasons, that there were higher costs than expected
in 2005 because of the recall of the Marquis devices. See Brief for the
Appellee, supra note 89, at 25.

Id. at *135.

154

Id. at *136.

155

Id. at *136-*137.
Id. at *137.
Id. at *138.
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Reg. section 1.482-1(c)(2)(i).

In this regard, the derivation of the adjustments for exclusivity
and access to improvements were not described at all. Most of the other
adjustments were justified by reference to the magnitude of these two
adjustments. See supra text accompanying notes 144-149.
156

See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 8, at 50-51.
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b. Litigation settlement.
To be comparable, the regulations require the
transactions to take place under comparable
circumstances and in the ordinary course of
business.157 The Pacesetter agreement arguably
fails both criteria because it was entered into in
settlement of litigation involving employment
and antitrust issues as well as patent issues.158
c. Cross-license.
The regulations also require consideration of
159
any “collateral transactions.” The cross-license
of Pacesetter patents is a collateral transaction that
calls into question its comparability. At a
minimum, an upward adjustment would be
required to account for the implicit royalty rate on
160
the cross-license.
d. Upfront fee.
The regulations require adjustments for
significant differences in contractual terms.161 The
Pacesetter agreement included a substantial
upfront fee ($75 million) whereas the
162
intercompany license did not. Although an
upward adjustment to the royalty rate would be
appropriate, none was made.
e. Different intangibles.
The Pacesetter agreement included a
narrower range of intangibles than the
intercompany licenses. Although the Tax Court
made adjustments for some product differences,
the adjustments were not supported by analysis,
and there were other differences that were not
163
accounted for.
f. Different profit potential.
The regulations governing intangible
property transactions require that transactions
have “similar profit potential” to be considered
comparable.164 This requirement reflects

157

Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2) (comparable circumstances) and
-1(d)(4)(iii)(A)(1) (ordinary course of business).
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Treasury’s response to section 482’s requirement
that income from intangibles be “commensurate
165
with income” attributable to the intangibles. The
Tax Court made an adjustment of 3.5 percentage
points for differences in profit potential but
undertook no supporting analysis. According to
the IRS’s analysis, Medtronic’s combined
operating margin was 52.6 percent whereas
Pacesetter’s pre-royalty margin was only 17.7
166
percent. Such a large difference in profitability
suggests that the agreements cannot be
considered comparable in the first place.
However, if an adjustment is to be made, 3.5
percentage points would seem to be inadequate.
In its appellant brief, the IRS pointed out
another anomaly in the Tax Court’s approach to
profit potential: While the court made only a 3.5
percentage point adjustment to the Pacesetter
royalty rate to derive the devices license royalty
rate, it made a much larger adjustment to the
devices license royalty rate to derive the leads
license royalty rate (adjusting the royalty down
from 30 percent to 15 percent) without
167
explanation for the difference in approach.
In conclusion, my central concern with the Tax
Court’s CUT analysis is that it relied on so many
adjustments that it was unmoored from both
prices and profits. That is, it is difficult to consider
a 7 percent royalty to be a valid price benchmark
if adjustments increasing the rate to 30 percent are
necessary. Any adjustment to a price benchmark
to account for very large differences in profit
would be highly speculative and unreliable. If it is
impossible to benchmark a royalty to a truly
comparable transaction, I believe a profit-based
method (such as CPM or RPSM) must be used.
F. Eighth Circuit: Remand
The Eighth Circuit took the IRS’s criticisms of
the Tax Court’s CUT analysis to heart. The court of
appeals emphasized four of the shortcomings of
the Pacesetter agreement laid out earlier: that it was
a litigation settlement, that it involved a cross-

See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 8, at 37-39.
Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2)(vii).
See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 8, at 41-43.

165

Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2)(i).

166

See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 8, at 39-40.

167

See id. at 44-47.
Reg. section 1.482(c)(2)(iii)(B)(ii).

Section 482 (second sentence).
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 8, at 49-50.

Id. at 72-74. According to the IRS’s analysis, although devices
generated more revenue than leads, profit margins on leads were
actually slightly higher than on devices. Id. This calls into question
whether different royalty rates for devices and leads were appropriate.
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license, that it had a $75 million upfront fee, and
that it covered different intangible property.168 The
Eighth Circuit concluded that the Tax Court’s
factual findings were insufficient to allow it to fully
evaluate whether the CUT analysis was
appropriate. It overturned the Tax Court’s decision
and remanded the case, instructing the Tax Court
to better substantiate its findings and analysis.169
The Eighth Circuit also instructed the Tax
Court to make appropriate findings about the
level of risk borne by MPROC:
Finally, the tax court did not decide the
amount of risk and product liability
expense that should be allocated between
Medtronic US and [MPROC]. The [IRS]
contends that [MPROC] bore only 11
percent of the devices and leads
manufacturing costs, which included its
share of the product liability expense, and
that therefore [MPROC’s] allocation of
profits should be a similar percentage
based on its economic contribution. The tax
court rejected the [IRS’s] 11 percent
valuation, concluding that it was
unreasonably low because it did not give
enough weight to the risks that Medtronic
Puerto Rico incurred in its effort to ensure
quality product manufacturing.
Accordingly, the tax court allocated almost
50 percent of the device profits to
[MPROC]. In doing so, the tax court also
rejected the [IRS’s] comparable profits
methods because it found that the
comparable companies used by the [IRS]
under this method did not incur the same
amount of risk incurred by [MPROC]. Yet
the tax court reached these conclusions
without making a specific finding as to
what amount of risk and product liability
expense was properly attributable to
[MPROC]. In the absence of such a finding,
we lack sufficient information to determine
whether the tax court’s profit allocation was
appropriate.170

IV. Alternative Approaches
A. CUT Method
The Tax Court certainly has the option to
defend its CUT method decision without
modifying the analysis itself. All that the Eighth
Circuit requested was for the Tax Court to provide
additional factual findings to support its decision.
Three of the Eighth Circuit’s requests were
additional findings about the comparability of the
Pacesetter agreement — specifically, findings
about the circumstances of the agreement, its
contractual terms, and the remaining intangibles
(intangibles that were included in the
intercompany license but not the Pacesetter
agreement).171 These are fairly straightforward
requests that the Tax Court would likely be
prepared to address with minimal additional
proceedings. Having said this, one of the Eighth
Circuit judges confessed that he “harbor[s]
serious doubts” that he will be persuaded that the
172
agreements are comparable. The Tax Court may
take this admonition to heart and abandon the
CUT method for one of the other methods
suggested here. But first let’s assume the court
decides to continue using the CUT method.
The final factual finding that the Eighth
Circuit requested was identified earlier: “a
specific finding as to what amount of risk and
product liability expense was properly
attributable” to MPROC.”173 This undoubtably
poses a much more difficult challenge for the Tax
Court than the other factual findings and is likely
to be the centerpiece of further proceedings once
they are rescheduled. The Eighth Circuit did not
frame this request in terms of whether the
Pacesetter arrangement was comparable to the
intercompany license, but rather in terms of
174
whether the “profit allocation was appropriate.”
So the Eighth Circuit is drawing a direct
connection between risk and profit. In a CUT

171

Id. at 614-615.

168
169
170

900 F.3d at 614-615.
Id. at 615.
Id.
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Id. at 618 (Shepherd, J., concurring).

173

Id. at 615.

174

Id.
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method analysis, such a connection would
implicate the requirement that the licenses have
175
comparable profit potential.
Recall that the Tax Court made an adjustment
for profit potential by adding 3.5 percentage
points to the royalty rate for the devices license,
which I consider inadequate given the large
difference in profit margins between Medtronic
176
and Pacesetter. Unfortunately, the regulations
are not helpful regarding profit potential, so it is
understandable that the Tax Court’s analysis
failed to fully account for differences. The
regulations state:
The profit potential of an intangible is
most reliably measured by directly
calculating the net present value of the
benefits to be realized (based on
prospective profits to be realized or costs
to be saved) through the use or subsequent
177
transfer of the intangible.
The problem with this regulation is that it
requires a more difficult and uncertain analysis
than is often appropriate. Generally, the operating
profit margin generated by the use of an
intangible is more important than the absolute
amount of profits generated. It is usually much
easier to make a reasonable estimate of the
expected profit margin than the total amount of
profits that might be generated over the economic
life of the intangible.
There are many ways an economic expert
might go about making a more accurate
adjustment for differences in profit potential. I
will offer one simple observation here. Consider
this comparison:
• the 7 percent royalty in the Pacesetter
agreement would leave Pacesetter with an
operating margin of only 10.7 percent (given
a pre-royalty margin of 17.7 percent);178 while

• total royalties of 38 percent for devices and
23 percent for leads leave MPROC with an
179
operating margin in excess of 30 percent.
If the royalty rates were adjusted to leave
MPROC with an operating margin similar to
Pacesetter’s, they would have to be increased by
approximately 19 percentage points.
B. CPM (Ex Post)
In theory, the Tax Court could abandon its
CUT method approach and adopt a traditional
CPM approach instead. In its Medtronic opinion,
the Tax Court rejected the IRS’s CPM approach in
particularly scathing terms, so it seems unlikely
the court will adopt a traditional CPM approach
— even with modifications. But let’s consider
what modifications the court could consider.
By “traditional” CPM approach, I refer to an
approach that is undertaken at the end of each
year. That is, it is based on actual profits (ex post
profits) rather than profits that were expected
when the licenses were initially entered into (ex
180
ante profits). Comparable companies are
identified each year, and a range of arm’s-length
operating profits are calculated. If MPROC’s
actual results fall within this range, there would
be no adjustment to the royalty in that year. If the
results are outside this range, an adjustment to the
royalty would be made that brings that year’s
181
results to the median of the range. Adopting a
CPM approach requires a willingness to accept
that the effective royalty rate (as a percentage of
sales) may differ from year to year depending on
whether an adjustment is required.
Assuming the Tax Court accepts the notion of a
variable royalty rate, the most likely modification
179

Total royalties are the sum of the 8 percent trademark royalty and
the applicable technology royalty on intercompany sales as determined
by the Tax Court. Operating margins are based on operating profit of
$598 million in 2005 and $925 million in 2006 (see supra note 8) and
revenue of $1.98 billion in 2005 and $2.882 billion in 2006. See Agreed
Computation for Entry of Decision, T.C. Memo. 2016-112 (Jan. 12, 2017)
(No. 006944-11), at page 3 of the detailed calculations.
180

175
176
177

In fact, strictly speaking, CPM must be applied on an ex post basis.
See reg. section 1.482-5(b)(1) (“tested party’s reported operating profit is
compared to the comparable operating profits”) (Emphasis added.). The
method described in the following section would actually be an
unspecified method.

Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii).
See supra text accompanying notes 164-167.
Reg. section 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(ii).

178

See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 8, at 49-50 (Pacesetter’s preroyalty operating margin).

181

This explanation is slightly oversimplified. In fact, CPM ordinarily
must be applied using average results over a multiple-year period for
both the tested party and the comparable companies. Reg. section 1.4821(f)(2)(iii)(B). See also reg. section 1.482-5(e) (examples of CPM using
three-year average results).
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to the IRS’s approach that it would make would be
to identify comparable companies that it considers
to bear risks that are more closely comparable to
the risks borne by MPROC. Arguably, different
companies should be selected each year depending
on how risks actually played out during the year
for MPROC. That is, if MPROC experienced the
negative effects of a risk playing out, only
companies that also experienced negative effects
would be included in the comparable set.
Conversely, if MPROC had good luck or managed
risks particularly well during the year, only
companies that also encountered good luck or
successful risk-taking would be included in the set.
In any event, because most of the comparable
companies selected by the IRS already bore all the
risks faced by companies in the medical device
industry, it is not clear how the Tax Court would
find a set of comparable companies that supports
a much higher profitability level than the IRS’s
comparables. One of the key reasons that the
court rejected the IRS’s comparables was that they
not only bore all the risks faced by companies in
the industry but also performed all the functions
that Medtronic as a whole performed. The Tax
Court would likely find it difficult to identify
comparable companies that bear a high level of
risk but perform only the limited manufacturing
functions undertaken by MPROC.
An alternative approach would be to identify
companies that have comparable functions and
assets but do not bear significant risks, and to then
make adjustments to the comparable companies’
operating profits that properly account for
MPROC’s risk profile. Most likely, this would
involve determining an upward adjustment to the
selected profit-level indicator (a risk premium). It
is beyond the scope of this report to propose a
precise approach, but it could involve using
standard finance and economic principles and
182
tools (such as the capital asset pricing model).
Having said this, it would arguably be more
appropriate to make a downward adjustment if
risks actually played out in a negative way during

182

See, e.g., Berk and DeMarzo, supra note 18, at 385-392. See also John
Wills, “Risk Measurement: Applying Financial Theory to Transfer
Pricing,” Tax Notes, Sept. 9, 1991, p. 1311; and Ozgur Toros, “Risk
Adjustment Issues and Application to U.S. Transfer Pricing Rules,” Tax
Notes Int’l, May 5, 2003, p. 471.
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the year, and to make an upward adjustment if
MPROC had good luck or managed risks well.
C. CPM (Ex Ante)
A variation of the traditional CPM approach
might be more acceptable to the Tax Court. Rather
than comparing the tested party’s ex post operating
profits against comparable companies’ profit
levels, the profits that the tested party is expected to
earn ex ante would be benchmarked against
comparable company profit levels. In stark contrast
to the traditional CPM approach, the CPM analysis
would be undertaken only one time. The arm’slength royalty rate would be determined at the time
the intercompany license is initially entered into,
and it would not be adjusted in future years.
An ex ante CPM approach would account for
risk in two different ways, consistent with solid
economic principles. First, a target operating
margin would be determined that reflects the
operating profits that the tested party would be
expected to earn if actual results play out as
expected. Either of the two approaches described
above for the traditional CPM approach could be
applied to determine the target operating margin:
• benchmark the margin based on profit
margins earned by companies that bear a
comparable level of risk as MPROC (as well
as having comparable functions and assets);
or
• benchmark the margin based on profit
margins earned by companies that do not
bear a significant level of risk (but do have
comparable functions and assets) and then
adjust this margin upward by an
appropriate risk premium.
Second, because there would be no ex-post
adjustment to the royalty rate, actual profits
would reflect the playing out of risk. If risks play
out badly, the tested party will not achieve the
target operating margin and may even suffer
losses. If risks are well managed, the tested party’s
actual results will exceed the target margin.
The most difficult step in applying an ex ante
CPM approach is the development of profit
projections at the time the license is entered into. To
quote an unrelated section of the regulations, these
should be “best estimates . . . normally reflecting a
probability weighted average of possible
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outcomes.” When a taxpayer is trying to
minimize the size of the royalty, there would be an
incentive to understate the licensee’s expected
profitability. Tax authorities would have the
opposite incentive. Although tax authorities
conducting an audit would have the benefit of
hindsight in assessing what profits should have
been expected, the determination should be based
solely on information available at the time the
license was entered into. If the Tax Court decides to
use an ex ante CPM approach in resolving the case,
a key challenge will be to make this determination.
To illustrate how this method would work,
consider this highly stylized example. First,
assume the following probability-weighted
estimate of MPROC’s sales and expenses apply to
each and every year that the license is in effect, as
noted in Table 2:
Table 2. Hypothetical Financial
Forecast for MPROC
Sales

$1,000

Product liability expense

$100

Other costs and expenses

$200

Pre-royalty operating profit

$700

Second, assume that the risk-adjusted target
operating margin is determined to be 15 percent.
The arm’s-length royalty rate would be 55 percent
of sales — that is, the difference between the preroyalty margin (70 percent) and the target margin
(15 percent).
Consider actual product liability expense to be
the main indicator of how risks play out. If risks
play out exactly as expected, MPROC will earn an
after-royalty operating profit of $150 (15 percent).
However, if unexpected product liability risks
materialize and actual expense is $200 (rather
than $100), MPROC’s actual operating margin
will only be $50 (5 percent). On the other hand, if
MPROC successfully manages its product
liability risks and actual expense is only $50, its
actual operating margin will be $200 (20 percent).

D. Profit-Split Method
Although an ex ante CPM approach has a
strong foundation in economic theory, it is not a
method that is explicitly specified in the
regulations. For this and other reasons, the Tax
Court may be unwilling to consider it. The
remaining method that is specified for intangible
property transactions is the profit-split method.
There are several reasons to think the Tax Court
would give this method serious consideration.
One is the fact that the Eighth Circuit specifically
framed the request for additional findings on risk
in terms of whether the “profit allocation was
appropriate.”184 Another is the fact that the IRS
and Medtronic had previously agreed to a profitsplit method as part of their prior-year settlement
agreement.185 Although the Tax Court did not
perform a profit-split method analysis, it allowed
the results of the parties’ prior-year agreement to
stand with minimal change.186
The problem with trying to use the profit-split
method for Medtronic is that there is no guidance
on how the bearing of risk should affect the
sharing of profit. I am not convinced that there is
a wholly satisfactory way to do so. However, I do
believe that a profit-split approach would be an
improvement over a CUT approach, so it is
worthwhile to give some thought to the question.
Recall that the method specified in the U.S.
regulations is actually the RPSM — the residual
profit-split method. Under the RPSM, the profit to
be split is the profit remaining after each party is
allowed a profit for its routine contributions.
Because the lion’s share of the profits in Medtronic
would be residual profits, I will not dwell on the
187
routine profit step.
The regulations provide that residual profits
should be split in proportion to the value of each
party’s nonroutine contributions to the business
activity.188 Contributions of intangible property

184

See supra quotation accompanying note 170.

185

See supra text accompanying note 77.

186

That is, the Tax Court found that Medtronic underpaid its U.S.
income taxes by less than $15 million in the 2005-2006 period. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
187

183

Reg. section 1.482-7(g)(2)(vi) (regarding the income method under
the cost-sharing regulations).

I would note, however, that Medtronic US’s routine profits should
be significantly greater than MPROC’s because it incurs more costs and
owns more assets.
188

Reg. section 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(A).
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are the only type of nonroutine contribution for
which the regulations provide guidance.189 If
RPSM were to be applied in Medtronic, bearing of
risk would also be considered a nonroutine
contribution. The Tax Court presumably will
make a finding regarding the relative share of risk
that is borne by each party. Conceptually, the
difficult question is how to weigh the relative
values of intangible property ownership versus
bearing of risk. That difficulty is compounded by
the fact that, unlike intangible property, the effect
of risk on profit would vary from year to year
depending on the extent to which deleterious
risks materialize. The most likely resolution of
these difficulties by the Tax Court may well be
quite simple: As a matter of rough justice, the
court might assume that the value of the
contribution of intangibles and the value of
contributions of risk are equal.
Consider a simple example of the calculation.
Although I have argued that only Medtronic US
contributed valuable intangible property, let’s
assume the Tax Court disagrees and finds that
Medtronic US contributed 90 percent of the
intangible property. Further, let’s assume that the
court finds that MPROC bears a substantial share
190
of risk — say, 40 percent. Medtronic US’s share
of residual profit would then be: (90 percent * 50
percent) + (60 percent * 50 percent) = 75 percent.

doubtful that either of these approaches will
prove satisfactory. Two additional methods that
may be more promising have been introduced
and described: an ex ante CPM approach and a
profit-split approach.


V. Conclusion
This report has explored the ongoing
Medtronic litigation in considerable detail. The
case is particularly interesting because one of the
related parties bears substantial risks even though
it does not own valuable intangible property. The
Eighth Circuit has asked the Tax Court to make
findings about the magnitude of this risk, but it
has not provided any guidance on how risk
bearing should affect arm’s-length transfer
pricing. This report offers four possible
approaches that the Tax Court could consider.
Two of them are refinements of methods
previously used by the Tax Court (the CUT
method) and by the IRS (traditional CPM). It is

189

Reg. section 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(B)(2).

190

This risk share would not only account for product liability risks
but also for all the other business risks, such as development risks and
patent infringement risks.
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